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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880406-CA 
v. : 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978), 
and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-404 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (1982) (Supp. 
1988) and S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp. 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982). 
2. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978). 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) (1978). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the prosecutor's remarks during his opening 
statement to the jury, where he may have alluded to a fact which 
was suppressed prior to trial, was substantially prejudicial to 
defendant and warrants reversal of his conviction or whether the 
remark was harmless error. 
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction for burglary and theft. 
3. Whether Jury Instruction 19 was supported by 
sufficient factual basis and whether such instruction was proper 
because it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof by 
creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Andrew R. Quintana, was charged with 
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of the charges on May 25, 1988, 
following a two-day jury trial, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Uno to a term of one to fifteen years on the second degree 
felony and zero to five years on the third degree felony to be 
served concurrently following his current prison term. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 25, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the 
Ted John family left their home at 1162 South Emery Street, 
located in Salt Lake County, for a short trip to Zion's National 
Park (R. 118 at 27, 39). When the John family returned home on 
September 27, 1987, around 4t00-6t00 p.m., they found a note from 
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the police attached to their door indicating that their home had 
been burglarized. The note indicated an investigation had been 
started, and requested that the Johns contact the police (R. 118 
at 29). 
Mr. John inventoried the house and reported that YAMAHA 
stereo equipment, valued at approximately $800, was missing (R. 
118 at 31). Specifically, an amplifier, cassette player and 
tuner were absent, together with the connecting wires or patch 
cords (R. 118 at 31-32, 40). The amplifier and the cassette 
player both measured fourteen inches by six inches by ten inches, 
with the amplifier weighing ten to fifteen pounds and the 
cassette player approximately two pounds (R. 118 at 43, 44). The 
tuner measured fourteen inches by three inches by ten inches and 
weighed approximately two pounds (R. 118 at 43-44). Mr. John 
later discovered and reported that a canister-type vacuum cleaner 
was also missing (R. 118 at 31). The vacuum cleaner, together 
with an accompanying hose attachment, was valued at approximately 
$100 (R. 118 at 31). 
At approximately 11:30 a.m. that morning, a neighbor 
living across the street from the John residence was returning 
home from the grocery store (R. 118 at 57). The neighbor, 
Patricia Rains, testified that, as she arrived home, she observed 
a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street and an 
individual standing on the porch of the John home (R. 118 at 58-
59). As she turned into her driveway, and from an unobstructed 
distance of approximately 30 feet, Mrs. Rains was immediately 
able to identify the individual standing upon the porch as the 
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defendant, Andrew R. Quintana (R. 118 at 61, 79). Mrs. Rains 
thought to herself, "That's Andy", recognizing his truck and 
wondering if he had been stranded (R. 118 at 59-61, 68). Mrs. 
Rains had never personally met defendant before but knew who he 
was. Mrs. Rains often saw defendant while on her way to work 
(including only a few days prior to the burglary/theft) (R. 118 
at 68-70) and at other times, having "little sisters that 
always—when we go in the car somewhere . . . are always saying 
there is so-and-so" (R. 118 at 78, 79). Mrs. Rains later told 
her husband that she "knew of him" (R. 118 at 76). Mrs. Rains 
watched defendant for approximately five minutes, indicating that 
at various times he knocked on the door, looked in the mailbox, 
peeked through the large picture window at the front of the John 
house, and looked around (R. 118 at 59-60). She described 
defendant as approximately five-feet-six-inches tall, wearing 
colorful Bermuda shorts and a T-shirt, the color of which she 
could not recall (R. 118 at 62). After standing on the porch for 
several minutes, defendant returned to the Mazda pickup truck and 
drove away (R. 118 at 62-63, 90). 
Mrs. Rains' husband, Calvin Dean Rains, testified that 
he observed the individual on the Johns' porch from a distance of 
80-90 feet (R. 118 at 87, 100). Mr. Rains had previously 
observed the individual park his truck down the street from the 
John home (R. 118 at 88, 89). He described the vehicle as either 
a Mazda or Nissan dark maroon pickup truck, two-wheel drive, with 
Mrs. Rains testified that she had seen defendant "several 
times" (R. 118 at 79), and believed that defendant may have even 
been at her home with her sister (R. 118 at 70). 
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the suspension lowered and with the front grill "broken out 
around the headlight." (R. 118 at 89-90). He was also able to 
note the license plate number of the truck as 5600AK, which was 
later reported to police (R. 118 at 50, 65-66, 90). Mr. Rains 
watched the man leave the truck and walk to the John home. He 
described the individual as a Spanish or Mexican male in his mid-
twenties, approximately five-feet-six to -seven-inches tall, with 
light to medium semi-wavy black hair (R. 118 at 87). Mr. Rains 
also testified that the individual was wearing multicolored 
Bermuda shorts and a very large tank top ("several sizes larger 
2 
than average. Really big.") (R. 118 at 87-88). Mr. Rains, as 
had his wife, observed the man "nosing around on the front porch 
acting suspicious." (R. 118 at 88-89). He testified that the 
individual "looked like he checked through the mailbox, looked in 
through the window and checked the front door . . . [h]e opened 
the screen, looked like he was shaking the knob to see if it was 
unlocked or locked" (R. 118 at 89). 
Mr. Rains then testified that a couple of minutes 
later, he (Mr. Rains) went to his truck and headed back to the 
store for additional groceries (R. 118 at 90). As he pulled out 
of the driveway and around the corner, he spotted the same 
vehicle parked directly across from an alleyway that ran behind 
the John home (R. 118 at 91). Mr. Rains, believing the 
circumstances to be rather suspicious, decided to stop and see 
what he could observe. He was initially unable to see the 
2 
Mr. Rains later clarified what he meant by tank top, indicating 
an article of clothing similar to a T-shirt with sleeves (R. 118 
at 101-103). 
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individual, but within a few moments, he saw a person come out of 
the alleyway (R. 118 at 92-93). He testified that the man he saw 
come out of the alley was the same man that he had seen on the 
porch (R. 118 at 93). The individual coming from the alley 
initially walked toward the maroon Mazda pickup truck, but, 
having spotted Mr. Rains in his vehicle, he turned around and 
started walking in the opposite direction. After a couple of 
steps, the man turned once again and headed directly for the 
pickup truck (R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains observed the individual 
carrying a large bulky object underneath his shirt (R. 118 at 
94). The individual entered his pickup truck and drove directly 
by Mr. Rains (R. 118 at 95). Mr. Rains then returned to his home 
and told his wife that he believed that someone had been robbed 
and they should call the police (R. 118 at 95). Mr. Rains, his 
wife, and some neighbors, proceeded to the backyard of the John 
home and observed that a back door and window were open with a 
window screen removed (R. 118 at 95-96). Mr. Rains also 
testified that weeds growing in the backyard of the John home, 
alongside the fence, directly adjacent to the alley where Mr. 
Rains had observed the suspicious individual, had been trampled 
down. He said it "looked like somebody had climbed over the 
fence" (R. 118 at 96-97). Mrs. Rains then called the police and 
reported the crime, giving defendant's name, his physical 
description, the vehicle description and the license number Mr. 
Rains had written down (R. 118 at 64-66, 96). 
Police Officer Chris Adhearn received a dispatch that 
day at 11:54 a.m. summoning him to 1162 Emery Street (R. 118 at 
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46-47). He spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Rains and received 
descriptions of the vehicle and the individual. The description 
given was a male Hispanic, dark hair, approximately five-feet-
seven-inches tall and 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47). The vehicle was 
described as a Mazda pickup truck, maroon in color with chrome 
trim and a damaged grill, license plate number 5600AK (R. 118 at 
47, 50). Upon investigating the John residence, Officer Adhearn 
found that the back door to the home was open, and there was 
damage to a side window where a screen had been torn away (R. 118 
at 47-48). Inside the home, it appeared to Officer Adhearn that 
several pieces of stereo equipment were missing and, inside of a 
bedroom, drawers had been partially pulled out of a dresser (R. 
118 at 48). Officer Adhearn observed, as had Mr. Rains, that it 
appeared that someone had walked through the weeds in the 
backyard toward the alley because the weeds were partially 
trampled (R. 118 at 49, 54). 
Officer Adhearn's report was given to headquarters, 
which issued an Attempt to Locate for the suspect vehicle. Later 
that same day, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Robert 
Robinson of the Salt Lake Police Department spotted and stopped a 
Mazda pickup truck, maroon with chrome trim, having a license 
plate number almost identical to that earlier reported by the 
Rains (only a single digit difference—3600AK as opposed to 
5600AK) (R. 119 at 4, 5). The driver of the vehicle pulled over 
was identified as defendant (R. 119 at 5). Officer Robinson 
informed defendant that he would impound the truck as a suspect 
vehicle in a burglary (R. 119 at 8). Officer Robinson indicated 
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that Mr. Quintana was wearing a blue pullover shirt with grey 
Bermuda-type shorts (R. 119 at 9). He also noted that on the 
passenger seat of the truck was some type of wiring apparatus 
which he seized. The wiring apparatus was eventually introduced 
at trial as Exhibit One and identified as patch cords for a 
stereo system (R. 119 at 9), Mr. John later testified that the 
patch cords were very similar to those stolen from his home, in 
that these specific patch cords were produced primarily for use 
with YAMAHA equipment ("I recognize that as unique for YAMAHA 
brand of stereo.") (R. 118 at 33, 42). Officer Robinson 
testified that defendant's vehicle was stopped within three to 
four blocks of defendant's residence and approximately five to 
six miles from the scene of the burglary/theft (R. 119 at 11). 
Officer Robinson indicated that when he questioned defendant 
about his activities that morning, his answers were confusing and 
conflicting (R. 119 at 7, 8). Defendant finally left on foot and 
proceeded home (R. 119 at 8). 
At trial, defendant's mother, Beulah Gonzales, and 
sister, Jerline Quintana, both testified. Beulah Gonzales 
testified that defendant lived with her and her husband (R. 119 
at 25). She testified that she could not recall her son owning a 
pair of colorful Bermuda shorts (R. 119 at 26). She further 
testified that on September 27, 1988, between approximately 
10:15 - 11:45 a.m., defendant was left home alone and neither she 
nor her husband could account for his whereabouts during that 
period of time (R. 119 at 29, 30). Jerline Quintana testified 
that defendant helped her move a washer and dryer between 1:00-
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2:00 p.m. on one day during the weekend of the burglary/theft, 
but she could not recall whether that was Saturday, September 
27th, or Sunday, the 28th (R. 119 at 20-22). 
Further, defendant's brother, Jack Quintana, testified 
that he was the owner of the maroon-colored chrome-trimmed pickup 
truck and there was damage to the front end of the truck, in that 
the front grill was missing. (R. 119 at 46) Jack Quintana 
further testified that he believed the patch cords seized by the 
police from the truck were his; although he conceded that at the 
time of the impoundment he was in jail for a felony conviction of 
burglary himself, and the last time he had seen the patch cords 
they were in the bottom of the seat of his truck and not up on 
the passenger seat (R. 119 at 41, 45-46). Upon cross 
examination, Jack further conceded that he had been convicted of 
as many as four other felonies since 1982 including burglary, 
assault, theft, and escape from prison (R. 119 at 40-41). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress 
the identification testimony of Mr. Rains because of improper 
identification procedures (R. 24-28, 31-35). The trial court 
took the motion under advisement and later issued an order 
granting the motion (R. 40-41). 
At trial, the prosecutor# in his opening statement to 
the jury, mistakenly indicated that Mr. Rains "saw the defendant 
come out" from the alley. Defense counsel objected to the 
statement (R. 118 at 17). After a discussion at the bench, the 
prosecutor made no other similar references during his 
explanation of Mr. Rains anticipated testimony, referring to the 
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individual seen by Mr. Rains from then on only as the "man" (R. 
118 at 17-18). At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening 
statement, defense counsel, with the jury absent, moved for a 
mistrial due to the statement by the prosecutor (R. 118 at 19-
20). The trial court denied the motion indicating that the jury 
had previously been instructed "that the only evidence that they 
are to consider is the evidence that's heard from the witness 
stand" (R. 118 at 21). A similar explanation that opening 
statements are not evidence was reiterated by both the prosecutor 
and defense counsel during their opening statements (R. 118 at 
13, 14, 22).3 
The jury found defendant guilty of Burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1982), 
and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (1982). Defendant was sentenced on June 6, 1988, to 
serve a term of one to fifteen years for the second degree 
felony, and one to five years for the third degree felony, at the 
Utah State Penitentiary, to be served concurrently with each 
other and consecutively with defendant's current prison sentence 
(R. 120 at 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor inadvertently 
mentioned the pretrial identification of defendant by Mr. Rains. 
3 
Defense counsel specifically indicated "[t]here is nothing we 
say that you can take to the bank on as far as evidence is 
concerned . • . what I am trying to say is that what the 
attorneys tell you is not evidence, and the Court has instructed 
you at the beginning, and they will also instruct you at the end 
of the case, the attorneys' statements is (sic) not evidence" (R. 
118 at 22). 
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This identification had been suppressed by the trial court as 
being improperly obtained. An objection was raised and the 
prosecutor did not refer again to defendant as the person seen by 
Mr. Rains. While this may have called to the jury's attention a 
matter which they could not consider because it had been 
suppressed, the error was harmless. The mention was brief and 
the trial court's instructions to the jury that only testimony of 
witnesses was evidence cured any harm that may have occurred. 
When Mr. Rains testified, he did not refer to defendant as the 
man he had seen. 
The circumstantial and direct evidence, coupled with 
reasonable inferences therefrom, which were presented at trial 
were sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The 
identification of defendant by Mrs. Rains was based on her having 
seen him before, although she had never personally met him. Her 
testimony as to why she recognized defendant immediately was 
ample to support her identification. The identification of patch 
cords found in the truck defendant was driving as being similar 
to those taken in the burglary of the John home was sufficient, 
coupled with Mrs. Rains' identification of defendant as being at 
the home, to support the verdict. 
The jury instruction given at this trial regarding the 
inferences which the jury may draw from defendant's possession of 
stolen property did not create an impermissible mandatory 
rebuttable presumption. The burden of proof was not shifted from 




ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTOR MAY HAVE ALLUDED TO A 
FACT WHICH WAS SUPPRESSED PRIOR TO TRIAL, 
SUCH ALLUSION WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 
DEFENDANT AND THUS CONSTITUTED HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
The State concedes that the prosecutor during his 
opening statement to the jury, alluded to the fact that Mr. Rains 
had identified defendant. The trial court had previously 
prohibited the State "from using the testimony of Mr. Dean Rains 
at any subsequent proceedings to identify Mr. Andrew Quintana" 
(R. at 40). Nonetheless, the State disagrees with defendant as 
to the magnitude of the error and/or any prejudice, and maintains 
that any error was harmless and does not warrant reversal on 
appeal. 
For purposes of this argument, it is important to 
clarify and understand the content and sequence of the 
prosecutor's opening statement. Prior to the alleged error, the 
prosecutor stated: 
Mr. and Mrs. Rains said [to police] that on 
Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right 
in this area, that they had observed a man 
coming down the street and coming up on the 
porch here at the home that belonged to Ted 
John. 
(R. 118 at 15) (emphasis added). Following this statement, the 
prosecutor indicated that it was only Mrs. Rains who identified 
defendant as the man to police, wherein he stated "Mrs. Rains 
told the officers that she knew who that man was. It was 
defendant, Andrew Quintana" (R. 118 at 15-16). 
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It was only after the above statements, wherein the 
prosecutor had Midentified" defendant through the anticipated 
testimony of Mrs. Rains, that the alleged error occurred when the 
prosecutor continued to identify the "man" as "defendant" in two 
brief remarks in his explanation of Mr. Rains' anticipated 
testimony. These brief remarks were as follows: (1) "Mr. and 
Mrs. Rains watched the defendant. He came down cff the porch and 
he came back up to the corner" (R. 118 at 16); and (2) "Mr. Rains 
came down, made a U-turn and parked on the other side of the 
Illinois Street, right next to the alley. And he said that the 
defendant was out of sight. He didn't know exactly where the 
defendant had gone, but essentially he said he saw him come out" 
(R. 118 at 16-17). Upon objection by defense counsel and 
following a conference at the bench, the prosecutor continued 
with the anticipated testimony of Mr. Rains without any further 
reference to the individual as the "defendant" but only as the 
"man".4 
Following the conference at the bench, the prosecutor 
continued with the anticipated testimony of Mr. Rains as follows: 
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is sitting 
here in his vehicle, and he sees this man come out of 
the area here on the diagram, which is almost adjacent 
to where Ted John lives. And he appeared to be 
wearing some kind of baggy shirt, something like a 
large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up 
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially when 
he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a minute, 
almost as if he was going to turn around and go the 
other way. Then he turned around and came back down 
the alleyway. 
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and went over 
and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup 
and took off. 
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, told her to 
call the police, and then he went over to Ted John's 
house and discovered that the back door was opened and 
-13-
Following the prosecutor's opening statement, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial due to the prosecutor's allegedly 
improper remarks* The trial court denied the motion (R. 118 at 
19-21). Defendant in Point I of his brief, contends that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1981) stated: 
[T]he [trial] court has broad discretion in 
determining whether a mistrial should be 
declared, and a denial of a motion for 
mistrial does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion where no prejudice to the accused 
is shown. The matter is not dissimilar to 
that of granting or refusing to grant a new 
trial. Such lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial judge and this Court will not 
reverse his decision thereon in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the limited 
circumstances where improper remarks by counsel may be grounds 
for reversal. The Court in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 
P.2d 422 (1973) indicated: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, [3-] did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the 
4 
Cont. went in and appeared someone had been in 
there, inside the house. He waited and the police 
eventually arrived. 
One of the things that Mr. Rains was able to do was 
to jot down a license plate number for this 1983 
pickup truck. He wrote that down and gave that 
information to the police department. (R. 118 at 17-
18). 
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particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks. . . 
Id, at 426 (emphasis added). See also State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 
185 (Utah 1986); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984); West 
Valley City v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Ut. App. 1987). 
In the instant case, even assuming the remarks by the 
prosecutor called to the attention of the jury matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, such error does not warrant reversal. The remarks may 
satisfy the first prong of the Valdez test, but the second prong 
is not met. 
In Valdez, the Court discussed the second prong, 
stating: 
The determination of whether the improper 
remarks have influenced a verdict is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court on 
motion for new trial. If there has been no 
abuse of this discretion and substantial 
justice appears to have been done, the 
appellate court will not reverse the 
judgment. 
Id at 426 (footnote omitted). In the instant case, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial for it 
is clear that the prosecutor's remarks did not influence the jury 
verdict for at least two reasons. 
First, as the trial court explained in its denial of 
defendant's motion for mistrial, the jury was told that any 
remarks by counsel were not considered evidence and were not to 
be used in reaching a verdict: 
[T]he court has already told the jurors that 
the only evidence that they are to consider 
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is the evidence that's heard from the witness 
stand, 
(R. 118 at 21)• Furthermore, following the court's cautionary 
instruction, the instruction was reiterated by both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel. The prosecutor stated: 
As Judge Uno told you, the comments of 
attorneys during an opening statement, of 
course, are not evidence. Evidence comes 
from witnesses who are called to testify, or 
it may come in the form of any exhibits that 
are received into evidence. 
(R. 118 at 13-14). Defense counsel noted, 
There is nothing we say that you can take to 
the bank on as far as the evidence is 
concerned. . . . [W]hat I am trying to say is 
that what the attorneys tell you is not 
evidence, and the Court has instructed you at 
the beginning, and they will also instruct 
you at the end of the case, that the 
attorneys' statements is (sic) not evidence. 
(R. 118 at 22) The State recognizes the fact that there is no 
certainty that the jury heeded the instructions of the court 
above, but such uncertainty exists in most cases and we must 
presume the integrity of the jury, where as here, no evidence to 
the contrary exists. See State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). 
Second, as set forth in Point II, substantial evidence 
of defendant's guilt was brought forth during trial, therefore 
the prejudicial effect, if any, of two brief remarks at the 
beginning of the trial, were minimal and constituted harmless 
error. See Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982) (Hany error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded'*). 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY AND THEFT. 
Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of burglary and theft. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the 
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns 
sufficiency of the evidence. The Court accords great deference 
to the jury verdict. It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. 
"The Court should only interfere when reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987), quoting State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, defendant has 
the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so inconclusive 
or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime." State v. 
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985), quoting State v. Kerekes, 
622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980); See also State v. Carlson, 635 
P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). 
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 
from the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. When the evidence is so viewed, the Court 
reverses only where the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt. See State v. One 
1982 Sivler Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987), 
citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); See also State 
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v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). The Court has succinctly 
stated that unless there is a clear showing of a lack of 
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. See Gabaldon, 735 
P.2d at 412; See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 
1977). 
The statutory requirements of burglary and theft are as 
follows: 
Burglary — (1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
Theft -- Elements — A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with the 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-404 (1978). 
As defendant concedes, there is no question that a 
burglary and theft occurred at the Ted John home on September 27, 
1988. The major issue before the jury and now on appeal is 
simply identification. 
Defendant contends "the State was unable to produce a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to identify Mr. Quintana as the 
individual who committed the burglary. Aside from no competent 
identification testimony, the State failed to connect Mr. 
Quintana with any of the John's stolen property." (Brief of 
Appellant at 17-18). In light of the substantial evidence placed 
before the jury to the contrary, that claim is without merit. 
Defendant was positively identified at trial from the 
testimony of Mrs. Rains (neighbor of the burglary/theft victim) 
as the individual present at the scene of the burglary and theft. 
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Mrs. Rains' testimony was corroborated by the description of the 
suspect given by her husband. 
Mrs. Rains testified that on September 27, 1987 she was 
returning home from the grocery store when she observed a 
burgundy pickup truck parked on the street and a man standing on 
the porch of the John home (R. 118 at 58-59). As she turned into 
her driveway, and from an unobstructed distance of approximately 
30 feet, she was immediately able to identify the man standing 
upon the porch as defendant (R. 118 at 61, 79). Mrs. Rains 
thought to herself "That's Andy", and also recognized his truck 
(R. 118 at 59-61, 68). Although Mrs. Rains had never personally 
met defendant, she knew who he was. Mrs. Rains often saw 
defendant while on her way to work (including only a few days 
prior to the burglary/theft) (R. 118 at 68-70) and at other 
times, having, she said, "little sisters that always — when we 
go in the car somewhere . . . are always saying there is so-and-
so" (R. 118 at 78-79). Mrs. Rains also testified that not only 
had she seen defendant "several times", but she believed he may 
have been at her home one time with her sister (R. 118 at 70, 
79). Further, upon entering her home, Mrs. Rains told her 
husband, who was also observing defendant, that she "knew of him" 
(R. 118 at 76).5 
It is interesting to note that defendant not only failed to 
set forth in either his Statement of Facts or his Argument, Mrs. 
Rains' plausible explanation of identification, but also 
erroneously concluded "Mrs. Rains was unable to • . . explain how 
she recognized him on the porch of the John home". Brief of 
Appellant at 19-20. 
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Mrs. Rains watched defendant from her driveway for 
approximately five minutes, indicating that at various times he 
knocked on the door of the John home, looked in the mailbox, 
peered though the large picture window at the front of the house, 
and looked around (R. 118 at 59-60). She described defendant as 
approximately five-feet-six-inches tall, wearing colorful Bermuda 
shorts and a T-shirt (R. 118 at 62). Mrs. Rains later called 
police and reported the crime, giving defendant's name, his 
physical description, the vehicle description (burgundy 
Mazda/Nissan pickup truck with chrome trim and damaged grill) and 
7 
license number (R. 118 at 64-66, 96). The variance between the 
license number given the police and the actual license number can 
be explained by the appearance of 5's and 3's on license plates. 
The only difference is that on 5's the downstroke is on the left 
and straight down. The top of the 3's is not rounded but has a 
downstroke which angles from the upper right to the lower left. 
Defendant contends that Mrs. Rains' testimony is "inherently 
unreliable" in that her "physical description of the individual 
is inconsistent with Mr. Quintana himself." Evidence at trial 
showed that defendant measured five-feet-four-and-three-C[uarters 
inches tall (with sneakers), and, when he was stopped by police 
hours after the burglary/theft, he was wearing a grey pair of 
Bermuda shorts. The height differential is trivial at best, and 
it is logical to believe the possibility that defendant changed 
his shorts during the hours between the burglary/theft and when 
he was stopped by police. 
7 
Defendant contends that since the name of Mr. Quintema may 
not have been dispatched to the police officers involved in the 
case, along with the other information provided by Mrs. Rains, 
her testimony is inconsistent with the evidence. Not only is 
defendant's assertion mere speculation, but both of the officers, 
when asked whether the name of Mr. Quintana was given to them, 
only responded that they could not recall (R. 118 at 47; R. 119 
at 13). 
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Mr. Rains testified that while waiting for his wife to 
return home, he observed the individual (identified by his wife 
as defendant) on the porch of the John home from a distance of 
80-90 feet (R. 118 at 87, 100). Mr. Rains had watched defendant 
park his truck down the street from the John home (R. 118 at 88, 
89). He described the vehicle as either a Mazda or Nissan dark 
maroon pickup truck with the suspension lowered, and with the 
front grill "broken out around the headlight" (R. 118 at 89-90). 
He also noted the license number of the truck as 5600AK which was 
reported to the police by his wife (R. 118 at 50, 65-66, 90). He 
described the individual as a Spanish or Mexican male in his mid-
twenties, approximately five-foot-six to -seven-inches tall, with 
light to medium semi-wavy black hair (R. 118 at 87-88). Mr. 
Rains, as had his wife, observed the man acting suspicious on the 
front porch of the John home (R. 118 at 88-89). Later, Mr. Rains 
observed defendant come out of the alleyway that ran behind the 
John home and proceed to the burgundy colored pickup truck, 
carrying something underneath his "baggy" oversized shirt (R. 118 
at 93). 
Not only did Mrs. Rains personally identify defendant 
at trial, but the evidence brought forth at trial confirmed the 
accuracy of both Mr. and Mrs. Rains' eyewitness accounts of 
defendant and his pickup truck. Further, the evidence showed 
that when defendant was stopped only hours after the 
burglary/theft, inside the pickup truck, and in the constructive 
possession of defendant, were YAMAHA patch cords similar to the 
ones stolen from the Ted John home. 
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Reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, there 
was sufficient evidence to satisfy all the statutory elements of 
burglary and theft, including identification. 
POINT III 
THE USE OF JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19 WAS PROPER 
AS THE INSTRUCTION HAD A FACTUAL BASIS AND 
DID NOT CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANDATORY 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
Defendant claims that Jury Instruction No. 19 was 
erroneously included over his objections. He claims error on the 
theory that (1) there was no factual basis for inclusion of the 
instruction, and (2) the instruction was a violation of his due 
process rights because, he claims, it relieved the prosecution of 
its burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jury Instruction No. 19 reads: 
Possession of recently stolen property, if 
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonably 
draw the inference and find, in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances shown by the 
evidence of the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen. 
Thus if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
was in possession of stolen property, that 
such possession was not too remote in point 
of time from the theft, and the defendant 
made no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, then you may infer from these 
facts that the defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you 
find it justified by the evidence, to connect 
the possessor of recently stolen property 
with the offense of burglary. 
(R. at 82). The State asserts that there was sufficient factual 
basis in the evidence to justify instructing the jury as to 
inferences it could draw. This instruction also was proper 
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because it did not raise the mandatory rebuttable presumptions 
which have been condemned by appellate courts. 
A. There Was a Factual Basis For Giving Jury 
Instruction No. 19. 
The evidence presented at trial showed that when police 
stopped and impounded the pickup truck driven by defendant (upon 
suspicion of its use in the commission of the burglary/theft), 
Officer Robert Robinson seized from on top of the passenger seat, 
and in the constructive possession of defendant, YAMAHA patch 
cords which had been reported stolen (R. 119 at 9). The YAMAHA 
patch cords were introduced at trial as Exhibit One, and 
identified by Ted John, as "very similar" to those stolen from 
his home along with his YAMAHA stereo equipment (R. 118 at 33). 
Mr. John testified that the specific patch cords taken from his 
home, and identified as Exhibit One, were produced primarily for 
use with YAMAHA brand stereo equipment ("I recognize that as 
unique for YAMAHA brand of stereo") (R. 118 at 33, 42). 
Although the State recognizes that Mr. John did not 
identify the patch cords with 100% certainty, his testimony that 
the cords were "very similar" and "unique" for use in YAMAHA 
equipment, when added to the following circumstances surrounding 
the seizure, give sufficient factual basis to support the giving 
of Jury Instruction No. 19. First, defendant and the truck 
(including the license number) matched nearly exactly the 
description reported to police by witnesses at the scene of the 
burglary and theft. Defendant was also positively identified at 
trial as the individual present at the scene of the 
burglary/theft. Second, although defendant's brother testified 
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that the cords were his, such testimony could reasonably be 
considered unreliable by the jury, since he conceded that at the 
time of the truck's impoundment, he was in jail for a felony 
conviction of burglary himself, and he had also been convicted of 
as many as four other felonies since 1982, including burglary, 
assault, theft, and escape from prison (R. 119 at 42-45). 
Based on Mr, John's testimony and the substantial 
circumstantial evidence brought forth, there exists ample factual 
basis for Jury Instruction 19. 
B. The Construction of Jury Instruction 
No. 19 is Constitutionally Proper. 
Defendant next complains that Instruction No. 19 
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof from the State and thus 
violates his constitutional rights. A comparison of the 
instruction given in this case to those which have been held to 
be unconstitutional reveals the fallacy of that claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1985), addressed for the first time the use of the 
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) in a jury 
instruction. In Chambers, the instruction complained of read: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
Id. at 324 (emphasis added). The Court held that the use of that 
statutory language in the instruction created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption, "i.e., a presumption which 'instructs the 
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jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves 
certain predicate facts'" Ld. at 326, quoting Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 
(1985). The creation of that mandatory rebuttable presumption 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to the 
defendant and Chambers' conviction was overturned. 
That holding was dispositive of the case of State v. 
Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) cert, denied 479 U.S. 813, 107 
S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986), in which the offending 
instruction was "a verbatim recitation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-
402(1)." Id. at 194. The use of the statutory language, with 
its inclusion of the term prima facie, created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption and required reversal of Pacheco's 
conviction. 
The Supreme Court next addressed the issue in State v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986). In that case, the instruction 
complained of read: 
Utah law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
was in possession of stolen property, that 
such possession was not too remote in point 
of time from the theft, and the defendant 
made no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, then you may infer from those 
facts that the defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you 
find it justified by the evidence, to connect 
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the possessor of recently stolen property 
with the offense of burglary. 
Id. at 1234. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the 
grounds that the instruction, while quoting the offending 
statutory language, also explained that the law only raised an 
inference, not a presumption. The Supreme Court said: 
the court explained that the statutory 
language incorporated in the instruction 
allowed only an inference of guilt, and then 
only if justified by the facts. 
Lest there be a misunderstanding of our 
ruling in this case, we emphatically declare 
that we do not retreat from Chambers. The 
trial court should not have used the 
statutory language in the instruction for the 
reasons stated in Chambers. We hold only 
that the instruction cannot be deemed 
reversible error in this case in light of the 
clear explanatory instructions that all that 
the jury could make of the term "prima facie" 
was a permissible inference. 
Id. at 1234 and 1235-36 (emphasis in original). See also State 
v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075-76 (Utah 1987). 
This Court addressed the use of the statutory language 
as the jury instruction in State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah 
App. 1987). The trial court in that case had used the statutory 
"prima facie" language, then tried to cure it by instructing as 
follows: 
Instruction No. 19 
The term "prima facie" as used herein 
means, at first sight; on the first 
appearance; on the face of it; so far as can 
be judged from the first disclosure; 
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presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless 
disproved by some evidence to the contrary. 
Id. at 1044. The State also argued that boilerplate instructions 
regarding the prosecution's burden of proof and reasonable doubt 
cured the defect of using the statutory language and defining 
"prima facie" in that fashion. This Court held that the 
mandatory rebuttable presumption had been created and the 
additional instructions did not cure the unconstitutional taint. 
The case most directly on point for the present case is 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987). It that case, the 
Supreme Court said: 
If the trial court had instructed in the 
language of the statute, it would have erred. 
. . . But the court did not so instruct. 
Rather, the trial court instructed the jury 
as follows: "Under the law of the State of 
Utah, possession of property recently stolen, 
when a person in possession fails to make a 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, 
is a fact from which you may infer that the 
person in possession stole such property." 
This instruction was not defective. . . . 
Id. at 456 (citations omitted). The permissive language of the 
instruction in Johnson did not create the mandatory rebuttable 
presumption which is unconstitutional. It was not just a matter 
of whether error was reversible as in Smith, no error was 
committed when the statutory language was not used and no 
presumption was raised. 
The language used in Instruction No. 19 in the present 
case is not the statutory language. The term "prima facie" is 
not mentioned. The first paragraph of the instruction is a 
paraphrase of the instruction given in Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 
456, which was deemed not to be defective. Arguably, the first 
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paragraph of the instruction in the present case is even more 
careful to avoid the presumption. The last two paragraphs of 
Instruction No. 19 are verbatim from the Smith case. They are 
the two paragraphs which the Supreme Court found to be acceptable 
and to be curative of the error of including the statutory 
language in the first paragraph in the Smith case. 
In light of the fact that Instruction No. 19 does not 
use the impermissible statutory language and couches the 
instruction in terms of inferences which the jury may find, in 
light of the evidence, it is a proper instruction and properly 
states the law. It does not violate defendant's constitutional 
rights because it does not create a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption which shifts the burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, respondent respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the conviction of defendant. 
DATED this n~~ day of May, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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